Cuba: Demographic or Systemic Crisis?

Notable Omissions

In the most recent presentations by the Government Commission for the Attention to Demographic Dynamics (the “Government Demographic Commission”), other than the announcement that the so-called “effective population” had declined to 9,748,532 inhabitants, one is left with the uneasy impression that far more was left unsaid than was actually disclosed. And as to what was disclosed, no explanations were offered by the institutions present—the National Office of Statistics and the Center for Demographic Studies—both so accustomed to the convenient use of proportions, percentages, and rates.

Nothing was said about what that reduction truly represents, even when compared against the “effective population” figure for 2023: 10,055,968 inhabitants as of December 31^st of that year. This represents a loss of 307,436 inhabitants, a decline of just under 3.1%—a rate five times higher than that experienced in the biennium 1980–1981 (–0.62%) following the Mariel migratory crisis, when net external migration reached –141,742 persons.

Equally striking is the omission of the actual number of births that occurred in 2024 (71,374), a figure published by the Ministry of Public Health earlier this year (MINSAP Editorial Board, 2025) when reporting its new estimates of infant mortality. There was thus no justification for resorting to approximate or imprecise numbers in the recent demographic analysis. That single figure would have sufficed to illustrate the significance of the sharply reduced number of births.

In comparison with 1899 (74,079 births), the 2024 figure represents a regression of at least 125 years, confirming a pattern of Malthusianism of Poverty within the Cuban population as a coping mechanism in the face of the ongoing systemic crisis. This pattern is compounded by the disproportionately high emigration of women (80% of them of childbearing age), at a ratio of 133 women per 100 men.

Also absent was the number of deaths recorded during the past year, although such data are known with complete precision once the preliminary stage of data collection has been completed. All that was reported was that “the number of deaths increased,” with no reference to the factors or causes underlying this rise, nor even to its absolute or relative magnitude.

This is not the first time anomalies have clouded the official mortality figures in Cuba. The total number of deaths in 2023 (129,049) was initially published only after an Associated Press journalist (Rodríguez, 2022) interviewed a senior official at the National Office of Statistics and Information (“ONEI”, by its Spanish acronym). That figure was subsequently replaced by a lower one (120,098), without any explanation—not only for the substitution itself, but also for how such a reduction could be possible at a time when the country had not yet emerged from the public health crisis caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, which was already being compounded by the emergence of other morbid processes. In this sense, neither then nor now is the actual number of deaths in Cuba known.

Apart from what can be gleaned from the aforementioned press report, the most outrageous omission in a presentation on Cuba’s demographic dynamics during 2024 is the complete absence of any mention of the word “migration.”

Once again, the statistical authorities cast a veil of obscurity over the demographic variable that, beyond any doubt, has driven the country’s demographic shifts for decades. Equally conspicuous is the deafening silence of the government commission on this issue—a silence conveniently echoed by the journalist as well.

This omission is all the more notable given the striking similarity between the reported population decline and the number of Cubans who entered the United States in 2024: 248,165.

Completing the Components of Population Change

Certain results can be derived from information already published by the ONEI, together with secondary sources—in this case, migration data from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency (CBP). From these sources, it is possible to establish with precision the number of Cuban entrants into the United States, whether through border encounters, immigrant visas, or the Parole Program (CBP One and CHNV), which was terminated on January 20, 2025.

From the total demographic change published for the period 2023–2024 (–307,436 persons), one may infer that the number of deaths corresponds to the sum of that total and the number of births, from which must then be subtracted the net migration balance—here approximated solely by Cuban entries into the United States, given the absence of Cuban official data on net migration and the lack of further clarification.

This yields an estimated 130,645 total deaths, a figure necessary for completing the balancing equation and generating a more accurate calculation of Cuba’s population. This estimate aligns closely with the number of deaths reported by an ONEI official for 2023 (129,049)—that is a 98.8% degree of proximity between the two figures. Although without offering an explanation, ONEI subsequently “erased” nearly 9,000 deaths from its published figures, the estimate confirms the upward trend that was acknowledged before the government commission.

Of course, this remains an estimate subject to error—primarily because of the assumption that Cuba’s net migration corresponds exclusively to emigration to the United States, without considering emigration flows to other destinations. The head of Cuba’s Directorate of Identification, Immigration, and Aliens admitted that some 3 million Cubans currently reside abroad across 140 countries (Rodríguez, 2024).

Furthermore, it is now known that between 2022 and 2023 the proportion of emigrants bound directly for the United States, as primary destination, within the total annual outflow from Cuba averaged 0.33631956, and that with the limited and fragmented information available for 2024 this proportion appears to have risen to 0.4553394331.

Accordingly, the net migratory balance would range up to a minimum of –545,011 persons, accounting for emigration to other destinations as well. This figure is adopted as the reference value for the re-estimation exercise below, although it may be regarded as conservative.

A Different Perspective

In ONEI’s new population estimate, the same error reported in the previous year before the National Assembly once again appears. What is labeled “effective population,” set at 10,055,968 persons on December 31, 2023, is derived from the official figure reported in the Demographic Yearbook of 2020 (11,181,595 persons), without any adjustment for the combined reduction of the 0–15 age group (from the Yearbook) and the 16+ population (from the Electoral Register)—both of which were directly affected by migration between 2013 and 2020.

For this reason, the 10,055,968 persons reported as the “resident effective population” on December 31, 2023, may be considered an overestimation, given the external migration balances—sometimes even positive or markedly underestimated—of 3,302 and 1,922 persons in 2013 and 2014, respectively; 169 persons in 2021; and 991 persons in 2022.

The baseline for these calculations incorporates the very error acknowledged by ONEI itself: “a significant portion of the migrant population was not classified as such under the prevailing legislation (the Decree Law applied since 2013 allowed residency abroad for up to two years without reclassification as emigration) compounded by the November 2020 migration moratorium”. This produced a sustained overestimation of Cuba’s resident population due to the mere shift in the manner of “counting.”

Correcting this deficiency—documented in scholarly articles published in 2024—yielded a revised estimate of 10,483,459 inhabitants in Cuba on December 31, 2021, in contrast with the 11,113,215 officially reported. Thus, between December 31, 2012 and December 31, 2021, the Cuban population is shown to have declined by 629,756 persons. This decline is undeniably explained by the effect of unacknowledged net external migration, given that “a significant portion of the emigrant population” was not previously officially recognized. By contrast, birth and death figures derive from vital statistics registers, which are regarded as “virtually complete.”

Based on the above, and on the available information on births, deaths, and the net external migratory balance for 2022–2023 (–1,795,682 persons), together with preliminary data released thus far by U.S. agencies, the Cuban population should be estimated at 8,619,931 persons on December 31, 2023.

This estimate stands in clear contrast with the official figure of 10,055,968 persons, a discrepancy explained by the preliminary adjustment of the starting population and by a more consistent estimate of the net external migration balance in the reference biennium. The official government estimate recognizes only –1,005,006 persons, without providing any methodological clarification or justification.

Nor does this official figure align with the public statement by the head of the Cuba Directorate of Identification, Immigration, and Aliens, who acknowledged that three million Cubans currently live abroad in 140 countries (Rodríguez, 2024)—a figure corroborated by international statistics, which place the number at just over 3.3 million (implying -1,236,437 as net migration balance for the period 2020-2023).

Re-estimating the Cuban Population as of December 31, 2024

Correction of the Initial Population (December 31, 2023) and the Net External Migration Balance

The baseline population figure used in the official estimates—since the decline experienced between 2013 and 2021 is not acknowledged—clearly demonstrates that the reported 11,181,595 inhabitants as of December 31, 2020 is not a credible number.  Rather, the total Cuban population for that date could reasonably be fixed at 10,557,977, slightly higher than the previously obtained figure for December 31, 2021 (10,483,459). This makes it plausible to expect in the continuing process of population decline, as is currently taking place in Cuba.

Using this new population figure as the baseline for the official estimate produced the previous year, together with government data on births and deaths and the adjusted net external migration balance, the figures for the calculation should have been 284,891 births, 405,512 deaths, and a new migration balance amounting to -1,236,437 (still underestimated). The corrected official population would thus decline to 9,200,919 “effective” residents as of December 31, 2023.

Even this figure could be considered an overestimate if one were to take into account the migration balance calculated previously, based on the final data for Cuban entrants into the United States by all avenues of entry. Now that these definitive figures have been officially published, they allow for a reevaluation of the balance for the 2022–2023 period, setting it at -1,785,701 persons. The resulting population as of December 31, 2023 would then be estimated at 8,629,906 inhabitants.

Calculating the Population as of December 31, 2024

Taking into account both estimates of the Cuban population on December 31, 2023, it is possible to determine the range within which the population would ultimately fall by December 31, 2024.

The upper limit of this range is derived from the population reduction reported by the Government Demographic Commission — namely, 307,436 fewer inhabitants — resulting in an effective resident population of 8,893,483 at the end of 2024. This represents a decrease of slightly more than 3.3%.

In other words, this is 855,049 fewer people than the official estimate of 9,748,532, which appears clearly overstated, since the statistical authorities seem to have included only emigrants to the United States as the sole component of the country’s external migration balance, without providing any clarification.

A second estimate could account for a greater reduction if based on the calculation for December 31, 2023 (8,629,906), produced in previous work. These figures were published in July 2024, based on finalized data on Cubans entering the United States during 2024.

Using information on births (71,374), deaths (130,645), and the net external migration balance (-545,011), the final population on December 31, 2024, would have declined to 8,025,624 inhabitants, representing a 7% decrease. In just a four-year period (2021–2024), this amounts to a cumulative decline of 24% relative to the estimated population on December 31, 2020 (10,557,977 persons), after correcting the omission of migration during the 2013–2020 period.

Even taking into account that these results may vary because the total number of deaths in 2024 was numerically inferred, all estimates indicate that the Cuban population is significantly smaller than officially reported. This provides clear evidence of a process we have termed “Demographic Hollowing,” the striking impact that our quasi-permanent model of economic, social, and political polycrisis has had on the multiplicative capacity of the Cuban population.

In this scenario of exodus and “symmetry loss of escaping subjects,” demographic dynamics are acting—more than at any other point in the country’s history—the so-called “the canary in the coal mine.” ^[1] (Díaz-Briquets & Albizu-Campos E., 2024).

Final Thoughts

The lessons remain the same as those identified in previous work (Albizu-Campos E. & Díaz-Briquets, 2023). Cuba has a population decline of a magnitude only otherwise observed in contexts of armed conflict. Yet it is claimed that there is no migration crisis; instead the authorities argue that the country faces a demographic challenge only due to low fertility levels.

From this perspective, the solutions proposed not only ignore the immediate demographic problems (unrestrained emigration) but also have little chance of success (promoting higher fertility under current conditions).  All of this tends to exacerbate other issues in the medium and long term (the already high and rising dependency ratios associated with an aging population).

Nor do the authorities recognize that poverty exists—whether relative, absolute, multidimensional, or whatever one chooses to define it according to the methodology used. Meanwhile, the economic-political model seems unresponsive. In fact, these issues are not even mentioned in the official guiding documents of economic policy.

No government entity is addressing the unfulfilled expectations in the population developed over more than 60 years under the economic-political model itself. Yet it is precisely these unattainable dreams that pave the migratory corridors along which a population if flowing out—an emigration that today causes so much anguish.

One might ask: isn’t this massive emigration also an expression of a voice demanding change? In any case, the exodus of dissenting voices is no guarantee of continuity

^[1] A phrase coined by Sergio Díaz-Briquets, applied to the role of demographic dynamics as the ultimate expression of the combined impact of all processes affecting the population.

Juan Carlos Albizu-Campos Espiñeira holds a Bachelor’s degree in Industrial Economics from the University of Havana (1986). He specialized in Demography at the Latin American Center for Demography, Costa Rica (1989). He earned a PhD in Economic Sciences from the University of Havana (2001) and a PhD in Demography from the University of Paris X-Nanterre (2002). He served as a professor at the Center for Demographic Studies from 1988 to 2018 (Full Professor from 2001 to 2018). From 2018 to 2023, he was a Full Professor at the Center for the Study of the Cuban Economy. Since 2023, he has been a Professor and Researcher at the Christian Center for Reflection and Dialogue – Cuba.

He has published, among other works, Cuban Demographic Dynamics: Background for an Analysis; Fertility, GDP and Average Real Wage in Cuba; International Migration of Cubans: Current Scenarios; Cuba: Demographic Scenarios Toward 2030; Toward a Population Policy Oriented to Human Development; Cuba: A Look at the Economically Active Population; Cuba: Demographic Aging and Demographic Dividend. Challenges for Development; Is the Decline in Economic Activity of the Population a Temporary Phenomenon in Cuba?; Demographic Distress?; The Ghost that Haunts Cuba; Cuba and Emigration: Exit as Voice; Cuba: A Brief Look at Emigration and Population; The Polycrisis and the Power that Reverses the Relationship between Politics and Economy; Life Expectancy in Cuba Today: Differentials and Conjunctures; and Maternal Mortality in Cuba: The Importance of Race.

He has received several National Awards from the Cuban Academy of Sciences and the University of Havana.