The Ghost that Haunts Cuba

Once again the nonsense about a “demographic storm,” now called a “demographic crisis,” is resurfacing. The complex subject that has its own special language is being discussed by those without the slightest appreciation of the laws that govern the behavior of populations - hindering a true understanding of those phenomena.

Cuba is not currently undergoing a full demographic transition; it already completed its first demographic transition, evidenced by a decrease in mortality and lower levels of fertility. This process was considered concluded between 1989 and 1993, according to some authors.^[1]

The use of apocalyptic epithets or qualifiers in the public discourse is, above all, counterproductive. Those terms—”perfect demographic storm” and “demographic crisis”—do not exist in the scientific fields that underpin human population studies. They only contribute to portray a reality that is, in fact, fictitious. In the words of Dr. Carmen Miró, “there are no population problems, rather populations with problems.”

It is worth mentioning the Programme of Action document from the 1994 World Population Conference held in Cairo, of which Cuba was a promoter and signatory. In fact, the argument of a demographic “storm” or “crisis” reflects an ideological bias that aims to boost the birth rate in order to reverse so-called “population aging”, a concept outside of the vocabulary of demographics.

Two years ago, my article “¿Zozobra demográfica?” (Demographic Distress) clarified that the decline in fertility from high to low rates is primarily the product of a broader demographic process experienced by Cuban society, known as modernization.  Demographic aging (in which life expectancy is not a relevant concept) is not at all a problem.

In fact, the real issue is Cuba’s lack of sufficient resources to support all its people, especially the senior citizens of today and the near future.

In 1900, the birth rate in Cuba was nearly six children per woman, and life expectancy at birth was around 33 years. Today there are nearly a quarter as many children and life expectancy at birth of both sexes averages just over 78 years - more than twice as high.

Cuba has never experienced such a favorable demographic situation as it does today and the key is that the population has lived through what in theory is known as the “reproductive revolution’, which means that children brought into the world today live almost three times longer than those born in 1900.  Then, infant mortality, one of the drivers of life expectancy at birth, was just under 225 deaths of children under one year old per thousand live births, while today it is just over four per thousand.

The real storm is that the Cuban population has completed this process of “reproductive revolution, “while the current economic model has failed to carry out a corresponding “productive revolution.”

Demographic aging—or, rather, demographic old age—is simply the process of transformation of the population's age structure as a consequence of a sustained reduction in fertility over time to low levels, plateauing below the population replacement level.

It is characterized by a gradual and sustained increase in the proportion of people aged 60 and over, which is one method of measurement. Over the long term, the number of people of age 60 and over slows until the population reaches a stable condition: a demographic model distinguished by fertility, mortality, and age structures that are constant over time.

The decrease in infant mortality, as with mortality across all ages, only rejuvenates the age structure of the population, because the mortality of the youngest decreases first, at the lowest levels and more quickly, increasing the number of survivors in the age groups at the base of the population pyramid—first from ages 0 to 14, then from 15 to 29, and finally from 30 to 39. These are the groups that always drive the increase in life expectancy at birth. And they also lead later to its deterioration, since they are the ages that have the greatest influence on this indicator.

The increase in life expectancy due to decreasing mortality, including infant mortality, has a rejuvenating effect on the age structure of a given population, as shown by authors such as Jean Bourgeois-Pichat, Roland Pressat, and Jacques Vallin, to name a few.^[2] In fact, John Knodel and Van de Walle used the results of the European Fertility Project to demonstrate not only the rejuvenating effect of the decline in infant mortality on the age structure of countries that had completed or nearly completed their demographic transition, but that the decline in infant mortality occurred later and as a consequence of the decline in marital fertility and the decline in competition among children for household resources^[3].

The only explanation now is the low standard of living of the Cuban population and the lack of control that Cubans have over their living conditions. The government’s recent “Ordenamiento” (Monetary Reordering) and its faulty implementation are the clearest and most immediate examples we have today. Has anyone noticed, reading the Ordenamiento’s guiding documents, that neither employment nor a sustained increase in labor productivity are included in its four main areas of focus?

The idea that demographic aging is a problem has managed to filter into some people’s heads. Curiously, nobody says that in reality the only factor capable of preventing aging, demographic or individual, is… death.

Nor does anyone explain anything about the real problems that affect the population:

• Insufficient job opportunities for young people and the very low participation of women, who are simultaneously criticized because “they don’t want to give birth,” that is, "they are bad and undeserving.”

• Low levels of economic activity, both by men and women, below those of countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay.

• Very low labor productivity.

• The decline that the economically active population is already experiencing.

• The loss of replacement capacity and, consequently, of the demographic dividend.

• Not taking advantage of the gender dividend.

• The low purchasing power of wages and the disappearance of the population's ability to save.

• The polarization of wealth and the accumulation of 85% of bank deposits in the hands of only 13% of the population.

• The exodus of people from rural to urban areas, leaving a void at the base of food-producing human settlement systems, along with the process of “de-agriculturalization” and decreasing agricultural yields.

• Poor use of arable land.

• Systematic emigration of people and labor resources in a process referred to as “the symmetry breaking of escaping ants” .

All of this occurs within an economic model that cannot produce the goods and services that the population needs to satisfy their growing basic needs, not even their basic nutritional needs. Gross domestic product (GDP) is expected to fall just over 8% in 2021. According to international organizations, for every dollar in reserve there are from three to four of external debt.

To summarize the problem: Cuba is haunted by a ghost: the aging of its population has combined with all the forces of the old institutions to join in a holy crusade and point an accusing finger at their agreed-upon scapegoat—Cuban women, who do not want to give birth—in a pernicious attempt to disguise as a population problem what is actually an economic problem.

The danger of the social security system breaking down lies in the fact that the local economic model does not provide the resources to sustain it.  And this will be even more serious when it implodes, around 2030, when what was the baby boom gives way to the retirement boom. The most populous generations ever born in Cuba will enter into retirement from economic activity; let it be emphasized that this is a direct result of the unusual increase in the birth rate during the period from 1957–1963.

Of course, some may disagree with these reflections, as with anything, it is impossible to reach unanimous agreement on these matters.  This is especially true when ideology is veiled by misused demographic terms to promote a neo-pronatalism that tries, or seems to try, to ignore its three sources and components: Franco's Falangism, Mussolini's fascism and Hitler’s Nazism.  To these we should add the aggressive pro-natalist policies of Stalin and Ceauçescu.

Demographic old age, which is clearly inevitable, the stabilization of the population and even its slight reduction, can become economic opportunities only from the perspective of investment in technology and innovation, a sustained increase in labor productivity, pension reform, the improved ability to save and consume, and even lowering the retirement age and consequently releasing people from jobs. Other countries are moving in this direction towards what is known as the “aged economies” model, as defined by Tim Miller^[4].

But what is unsustainable is what the most recent censuses showed - almost a million and a half persons who are available today, qualified and of working age, do not even declare themselves as seeking work. Add these to nearly another million people whose jobs were eliminated (considered “redundant” or “surplus”) by virtue of the workforce reorganization process more than a decade ago and who were to have been incorporated into development plans for what was expected to be a near future. The result is almost three million qualified people of working age that the model has not and is unable to incorporate into the workforce today.

Instead, we only hear about the importance of increasing the birth rate, without considering that such an increase, capable of decisively changing the age structure of the population, would become not a factor reducing the demographic age of the population but would counter the accelerated economic growth that may result from a decline in a country's birth and death rates and the subsequent change in the age structure of the population (the “demographic dividend”) since it would increase the number of net dependents in economic terms.

Babies born in the next few years would not enter the labor market before age 22 (after 2045), and would overwhelm the current economic system. The retirement boom would coincide with a new baby boom, straining not only the pension system, but also all other social services including health care and education, given the lack of the necessary resources to sustain them.

All this would occur in a country that already fell 22 places in its level of human development between 2007 and 2017; future consequences are not difficult to predict^[5].
 

Lessons

Once again, herein lies the problem. Adopting the proposals of the moment would lead to many mistakes. The conditions in a given population are always extremely complicated.  Anyone who has not grasped the nature of the relationship between development and the characteristics of a population will be unable to navigate the more complex multidimensional interplay of its demographic dynamics.

Those who shrink at tackling the simplest problems will surely stumble into very serious complications. Those who show little respect for the correct application of demographic analysis toward the solution of complex problems are the same people who, in their lengthy speeches, always use dire examples and convoluted explanations as they struggle to describe problems without an understanding of demography.

Natalism (pronatalism) is a doctrine that promotes political measures to attain a higher birth rate in a territory or State, through nationalist demographic policies. It advocates increasing the population in order to maintain what is considered an optimum national population to achieve military or economic objectives—having rapidly replaceable troops or abundant labor at affordable prices, respectively. This form of populationism is directly opposed to the effective exercise of human, sexual, and reproductive rights of a population.

The political objective of natalism is to increase the members of a religious, ethnic, or national group to increase political, social, economic, and military power and influence, by promoting abundant reproduction, praising large families, paternity, and women’s dedication to the domestic realm and procreation. Economic and social incentives are created to encourage the population to reproduce at a greater rate.

In general, natalist policies oppose family planning, advocate limiting or prohibiting access to contraceptive methods (particularly to the most affordable and effective methods, such as condoms), and criminalize abortion. These are violations of human rights, as well as reproductive and sexual rights recognized by international law.

The most important criticism that can be made of policies that promote births—natalism, pronatalism, or whatever one calls them—is the general notion that these policies regard human beings as mere means or vehicles to achieve certain ends, be they military, economic, political, or ethnic (basically abundant workers and army soldiers). Individual freedom established as part of human rights, reproductive rights, sexual rights, and reproductive health, is the instrument that human beings have to decide whether or not to reproduce.

From that standpoint, these natalist policies are contrary to the interests and freedom of citizens to decide independently how many children they wish to have, and when. So let us end with a question that merits reflection: Is Cuba’s most pressing problem today the low birth rate, or is it the reduction in the level of human development experienced by its population as a consequence of, among other factors, the inability of the economic model to produce the goods and services necessary to satisfy its growing needs?

^[1] To understand how Cuba completed that transition in the absence of economic development, see Cuba. Transición de la fecundidad. Cambio social y conducta reproductiva (CEDEM, ONE, MINSAP, 1995). In fact, some argue that fertility transition was completed once it was consolidated below its replacement level, that is, after 1978. In addition, there are at least two doctoral theses, by Grisell Rodríguez Gómez and Marisol Alfonso de Armas, which show that the Cuban population today is already undergoing what has been called the second demographic transition (Rodríguez G., 2013) (Alfonso de Armas, 2009) (Rodríguez G. & Alfonso de Armas, 2016).

^[2] Jean Bourgeois-Pichat (Bourgeois-Pichat, 1952; Burgeois-Pichat, 1977), Roland Pressat (Pressat, 1983), Jacques Vallin (Vallin & Caselli, 1989)

^[3] John Knodel and Van de Walle (Pebley, Hermalin, & Knodel, 1991; Knodel, 1978; Van de Walle, 1985; Knodel & Van de Walle, 1967).

^[4] Tim Miller (Lee, Mason, & Miller, 2001; Miller, 2013).

^[5] See “¿Es el descenso de la actividad económica de la población un fenómeno temporal en Cuba?" (Albizu-Campos E., 2020), and Juan Pérez de la Riva:“Cuba. Hacia una política de población orientada al desarrollo humano” or “La población de Cuba y sus problemas,” a classic that has never been more current than it is today.

This article is a summary of an academic paper in Spanish that can be downloaded below.

JCACE Fantasma Completo (ed) + Accessibility.pdf

Professor Albizu-Campos is affiliated with the Center for the Study of the Cuban Economy at the University of Havana, where he is also a full professor in economic sciences.